If someone is strongly Pro-Choice (i.e. has a high credence in that view) would you say that the considerations here should lead them to lower the total probability of Christianity being true as a whole given its endorsement of the Pro-Life position historically and presently?
Unlike Atheism, where I consider myself more dispassionate and very much a lay person, I have a background in medical research and so feel I have a bit more expertise on the Abortion side of things, which gives my credence more weight I would think.
I don't think a background in medical research is super helpful when it comes to hashing out the morality of abortion. All the empirical knowledge in the world won't tell you whether a human fetus is a person or not; that takes philosophy!
Now, obviously there are *some* empirical aspects to the abortion debate, but they mostly concern scientifically uncontroversial claims (e.g. that human organisms begin to exist at fertilization, that they don't become conscious until many weeks into pregnancy, and so on).
Apologies on the late response on this, but just want to give a few comments:
For the record, I 100% agree with you that the Abortion debate is a philosophical matter, as opposed to a scientific one. I often get frustrated with the latent scientism that is common among lay pro-life advocates, and it makes most conversations on the subject unfruitful.
The point is that when it comes to the Abortion debate, from a personal perspective I'm pretty familiar with the relevant medical facts, and have a lay level of philosophical training to see how they integrate with the various complex issues involved in the debate. Not to mention, I've known and met many of the intellectual leaders of the Pro-Life movement (I was fortunate to a seminar at Princeton with Prof. George) and so have an understanding of that aspect too.
This is all just to say that from my epistemic position if any view entails that Abortion is morally wrong, then from my epistemic standpoing that would be consideration to lower my credence for that position. Of course, I'm fallible as we all are on these things.
From what I see up front, Wyman is philosophically confused. He says that it's arbitrary to assign a beginning to a biological process like life, that we should instead view it as a cycle, and that the beginning of life is really a matter of cultural convention. If that's right, then a society which decided to regard a child's first word as the beginning of life wouldn't be getting anything objectively wrong. But that's crazy!
Perhaps a better way of stating the point is this: it is almost completely uncontroversial that human organisms *as they are understood in the context of the philosophical debate concerning abortion* begin to exist at conception. There are some philosophical objections to this claim, but they're really quite weak: https://philpapers.org/rec/MILHOB
I think this point--"if the church is guided by the Holy Spirit, then it is hard to see why it would be introducing genuinely new moral ideas which turned out to be seriously in error"--is extremely insightful.
But I have an example of a Christian moral teaching that was both genuinely new and seriously in error. One which goes back to Jesus himself, and was unanimously embraced by Patristic authorities--*more* unanimously than the acceptance of slavery, where Gregory of Nyssa heroically dissented.
I'm referring to the absolute ban on divorce, save for adultery--and, very significantly, with no similar exception for abuse.
I'm aware that contemporary apostolic Christianity, Orthodox and Catholic alike, has softened this stance in practice. Orthodoxy started recognizing abuse as a grounds for divorce in the 20th century (in Russia, canon law was changed in 1916). Catholicism started recognizing abuse as a grounds for separation in the High Middle Ages (c.1300). But the actual Patristic sources are unanimous in decreeing that a woman violently abused by her husband must remain with him and endure it--she sins by leaving even if she doesn't remarry. Basil the Great spells this out in his canonical letter on legitimate grounds for divorce: if a battered wife who "cannot bear the blows" leaves her husband, she's guilty of culpable abandonment.
And this was, seemingly, *the* most genuinely unique Christian moral teaching in its cultural context. There were pagan Greco-Roman philosophers who denounced infanticide, abortion, child abandonment (Musonius Rufus), male infidelity, pederasty, forced prostitution (Dio Chrysostom), and non-reproductive sex--but not a single one who morally condemned divorce. Roman law, famously, allowed either spouse to initiate divorce for any reason--until Constantine and his successors ended this. Note, in particular, that while the earlier, compromising, Theodosian Code left serious physical abuse as a permitted grounds for divorce, Justinian's revision eliminated that escape, thus bringing secular law in line with Church doctrine.
And, on the Jewish side, while the Torah grants only the husband the right to initiate divorce, Second Temple Judaism--including in Palestine--seems *in practice* to have allowed women to initiate as well, as shown by preserved legal papyri. Already in the Mishnah, the idea that wives have the right to divorce is their husband is in some way unbearable has developed, drawing on the stipulation in Exodus 21 about the things a wife has a right to expect from her husband, and in medieval Judaism this evolved into a right (and even a duty) to divorce in case of physical abuse.
This seems like an underdiscussed weighty piece of evidence against the truth of Christianity--that *the* most distinctive new Christian moral teaching was seriously enough in error that no current church maintains it in its old rigor.
I think this is a difficult case (assuming you're right about the Fathers, which I admittedly haven't checked). But remember: the Patristic witness is relevant because it testifies to an apostolic teaching, which itself gives us evidence of divine revelation. But in the case of divorce and remarriage, we have Christ's own words in scripture (as well as the subsequent interpretation of the Church), and we can see that they don't teach that it is sinful to separate from an abusive spouse. So we can accept subsequent moral development on the part of the Church as better reflecting Christ's words. But in the case of abortion, our only witness concerning what the apostles taught about fetal life comes from the Fathers, and they unanimously testify to its full value.
In other words, perhaps we can say that the genuinely novel moral teaching was just the prohibition of divorce and remarriage, and the prohibition of separation from abusive spouses was a mistake. But one can't make that move for abortion, since the whole teaching hinges on fetal value.
It does strike me as curious that Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 7, which specify that a wife can *either* be reconciled with her husband *or* live apart but remain unmarried, weren't interpreted in the Patristic church as permitting separation without remarriage.
The one exception I've found is in John Chrysostom's On Virginity, where he cites the passage to urge women separated from abusive husbands not to return to them. (A fascinating but apparently unique departure from normal Patristic teaching on the subject, which he sadly doesn't return to in his sermons addressed to women facing abuse.) But in his sermon series on 1 Corinthians, Chrysostom interprets the passage in 1 Corinthians 7 as Paul saying that separation would be a sin in any case, but that it would be an *even worse* sin to remarry.
"Now, notice that for the pro-choicer’s objection to the Patristic argument to succeed, they have to propose a very different sort of moral development: they must contend that the Fathers overestimated the value of human embryos, that here they believed too much in human equality, that in this case their moral circle was too wide."
I don't think this is true, I think it is in line with the trend of freedom to have minimal restrictions on abortion. I am not a Christian, so either way this argument holds no rhetorical sway on me, but still, I laid out the argument in one of my most recent posts.
(1) Clearly, the argument of this post will only succeed if one thinks that the Patristic tradition has epistemic weight. I don't expect it to sway non-Christians.
(2) I don't think one can appeal to freedom here. The pro-choicer has to deny that unborn human beings are persons with full moral status in order for their view to make sense. (I don't think bodily autonomy arguments a la Thomson have a snowball's chance in hell of succeeding.) But then the Patristic witness becomes relevant, since the Fathers seem to testify to an apostolic teaching concerning the moral standing of unborn human beings.
If someone is strongly Pro-Choice (i.e. has a high credence in that view) would you say that the considerations here should lead them to lower the total probability of Christianity being true as a whole given its endorsement of the Pro-Life position historically and presently?
If somebody is strongly committed to P, then a view which implies ~P will lose plausibility. But I think in this case, you should just give up on P :)
Unlike Atheism, where I consider myself more dispassionate and very much a lay person, I have a background in medical research and so feel I have a bit more expertise on the Abortion side of things, which gives my credence more weight I would think.
I don't think a background in medical research is super helpful when it comes to hashing out the morality of abortion. All the empirical knowledge in the world won't tell you whether a human fetus is a person or not; that takes philosophy!
Now, obviously there are *some* empirical aspects to the abortion debate, but they mostly concern scientifically uncontroversial claims (e.g. that human organisms begin to exist at fertilization, that they don't become conscious until many weeks into pregnancy, and so on).
Apologies on the late response on this, but just want to give a few comments:
For the record, I 100% agree with you that the Abortion debate is a philosophical matter, as opposed to a scientific one. I often get frustrated with the latent scientism that is common among lay pro-life advocates, and it makes most conversations on the subject unfruitful.
I actually would contest the idea of an organism beginning to exist at fertilization as as scientifically uncontroversial claim (see some of Dr. Wyman's work here: https://oyc.yale.edu/molecular-cellular-and-developmental-biology/mcdb-150/lecture-23), but that's a differnet issue.
The point is that when it comes to the Abortion debate, from a personal perspective I'm pretty familiar with the relevant medical facts, and have a lay level of philosophical training to see how they integrate with the various complex issues involved in the debate. Not to mention, I've known and met many of the intellectual leaders of the Pro-Life movement (I was fortunate to a seminar at Princeton with Prof. George) and so have an understanding of that aspect too.
This is all just to say that from my epistemic position if any view entails that Abortion is morally wrong, then from my epistemic standpoing that would be consideration to lower my credence for that position. Of course, I'm fallible as we all are on these things.
Thanks for the reply.
From what I see up front, Wyman is philosophically confused. He says that it's arbitrary to assign a beginning to a biological process like life, that we should instead view it as a cycle, and that the beginning of life is really a matter of cultural convention. If that's right, then a society which decided to regard a child's first word as the beginning of life wouldn't be getting anything objectively wrong. But that's crazy!
Perhaps a better way of stating the point is this: it is almost completely uncontroversial that human organisms *as they are understood in the context of the philosophical debate concerning abortion* begin to exist at conception. There are some philosophical objections to this claim, but they're really quite weak: https://philpapers.org/rec/MILHOB
I think this point--"if the church is guided by the Holy Spirit, then it is hard to see why it would be introducing genuinely new moral ideas which turned out to be seriously in error"--is extremely insightful.
But I have an example of a Christian moral teaching that was both genuinely new and seriously in error. One which goes back to Jesus himself, and was unanimously embraced by Patristic authorities--*more* unanimously than the acceptance of slavery, where Gregory of Nyssa heroically dissented.
I'm referring to the absolute ban on divorce, save for adultery--and, very significantly, with no similar exception for abuse.
I'm aware that contemporary apostolic Christianity, Orthodox and Catholic alike, has softened this stance in practice. Orthodoxy started recognizing abuse as a grounds for divorce in the 20th century (in Russia, canon law was changed in 1916). Catholicism started recognizing abuse as a grounds for separation in the High Middle Ages (c.1300). But the actual Patristic sources are unanimous in decreeing that a woman violently abused by her husband must remain with him and endure it--she sins by leaving even if she doesn't remarry. Basil the Great spells this out in his canonical letter on legitimate grounds for divorce: if a battered wife who "cannot bear the blows" leaves her husband, she's guilty of culpable abandonment.
And this was, seemingly, *the* most genuinely unique Christian moral teaching in its cultural context. There were pagan Greco-Roman philosophers who denounced infanticide, abortion, child abandonment (Musonius Rufus), male infidelity, pederasty, forced prostitution (Dio Chrysostom), and non-reproductive sex--but not a single one who morally condemned divorce. Roman law, famously, allowed either spouse to initiate divorce for any reason--until Constantine and his successors ended this. Note, in particular, that while the earlier, compromising, Theodosian Code left serious physical abuse as a permitted grounds for divorce, Justinian's revision eliminated that escape, thus bringing secular law in line with Church doctrine.
And, on the Jewish side, while the Torah grants only the husband the right to initiate divorce, Second Temple Judaism--including in Palestine--seems *in practice* to have allowed women to initiate as well, as shown by preserved legal papyri. Already in the Mishnah, the idea that wives have the right to divorce is their husband is in some way unbearable has developed, drawing on the stipulation in Exodus 21 about the things a wife has a right to expect from her husband, and in medieval Judaism this evolved into a right (and even a duty) to divorce in case of physical abuse.
This seems like an underdiscussed weighty piece of evidence against the truth of Christianity--that *the* most distinctive new Christian moral teaching was seriously enough in error that no current church maintains it in its old rigor.
I think this is a difficult case (assuming you're right about the Fathers, which I admittedly haven't checked). But remember: the Patristic witness is relevant because it testifies to an apostolic teaching, which itself gives us evidence of divine revelation. But in the case of divorce and remarriage, we have Christ's own words in scripture (as well as the subsequent interpretation of the Church), and we can see that they don't teach that it is sinful to separate from an abusive spouse. So we can accept subsequent moral development on the part of the Church as better reflecting Christ's words. But in the case of abortion, our only witness concerning what the apostles taught about fetal life comes from the Fathers, and they unanimously testify to its full value.
In other words, perhaps we can say that the genuinely novel moral teaching was just the prohibition of divorce and remarriage, and the prohibition of separation from abusive spouses was a mistake. But one can't make that move for abortion, since the whole teaching hinges on fetal value.
Hopefully that's a useful reply!
That's an interesting point!
It does strike me as curious that Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 7, which specify that a wife can *either* be reconciled with her husband *or* live apart but remain unmarried, weren't interpreted in the Patristic church as permitting separation without remarriage.
The one exception I've found is in John Chrysostom's On Virginity, where he cites the passage to urge women separated from abusive husbands not to return to them. (A fascinating but apparently unique departure from normal Patristic teaching on the subject, which he sadly doesn't return to in his sermons addressed to women facing abuse.) But in his sermon series on 1 Corinthians, Chrysostom interprets the passage in 1 Corinthians 7 as Paul saying that separation would be a sin in any case, but that it would be an *even worse* sin to remarry.
(One of the main sources I'm relying on is "Marriage in the Western Church": https://archive.org/details/marriageinwester0000reyn/mode/2up?view=theater )
"Now, notice that for the pro-choicer’s objection to the Patristic argument to succeed, they have to propose a very different sort of moral development: they must contend that the Fathers overestimated the value of human embryos, that here they believed too much in human equality, that in this case their moral circle was too wide."
I don't think this is true, I think it is in line with the trend of freedom to have minimal restrictions on abortion. I am not a Christian, so either way this argument holds no rhetorical sway on me, but still, I laid out the argument in one of my most recent posts.
Two points:
(1) Clearly, the argument of this post will only succeed if one thinks that the Patristic tradition has epistemic weight. I don't expect it to sway non-Christians.
(2) I don't think one can appeal to freedom here. The pro-choicer has to deny that unborn human beings are persons with full moral status in order for their view to make sense. (I don't think bodily autonomy arguments a la Thomson have a snowball's chance in hell of succeeding.) But then the Patristic witness becomes relevant, since the Fathers seem to testify to an apostolic teaching concerning the moral standing of unborn human beings.