This sort of logic could be used to justify forcing people to take lots of ridiculous positions so long as there's "reasonable debate" over the truth of the position and one side claims terrible consequences if they are correct.
If vegans are right, eating meat is deeply immoral. The debate over eating meat is complicated. Therefore, let's ban meat eating to be "safe".
If Christians are right, raising your kid up as a non-Christian is deeply immoral. The possible consequences of raising a child in a secular household (your child dies and goes to hell) are much worse than the consequences of forcing parents to raise a child as a Christian. Therefore, let's force all parents to raise their children as Christians.
Moral risk arguments aren't taken seriously for arguments like these. They shouldn't be taken seriously for abortion, either.
The religion case is complicated by the fact that there are many different religions, each of which promises infinite rewards and punishments. So it isn't as simple as "if the Christians are right, it would be bad for you, so you'd better not risk it." Of course, one might argue that it's rationally obligatory to follow the religion that one takes to be the most likely (modern versions of Pascal's wager work this way), and that doesn't strike me as implausible.
The veganism point might actually just be correct; I DO think it's immoral to eat factory farmed animal products, and a large part of this is based on the risk of contributing to enormous suffering. I think banning factory farming would be entirely morally acceptable (though under the circumstances it might not be possible, I'm not sure). It's also worth noting that even hardline vegans don't think that cows and chickens are persons, so the stakes here are much lower than with abortion, where the personhood of the unborn is the core of the debate.
Moral risk arguments in general are not rejected outright. Here's an obvious example: suppose you're about to demolish a building, and you're only about 90% sure that it's been completely evacuated. Is it morally permissible to demolish the building? If you say no (and you obviously should), then you're granting the basic line of reasoning used above.
I don't think the fact other religions exist has much impact on the argument. There are other theories of personhood, and they don't seem to impact your version of the moral risk argument. Rather, your argument assumes that the theory of personhood where abortion has the *most* devastating consequences (the personhood from conception view) should be the one considered when making the moral risk argument against the legality of abortion. The likelihood of this particular view of personhood being correct does not come into play, so long as you assert a non-zero likelihood of the extreme position being correct.
Likewise, by your reasoning, we should consider only the religious positions where not converting has the worst consequences. Christianity has some of the worst consequences for not converting (Hell for eternity, under some forms) and so, by your reasoning, Christianity should be the "default" for all parents. (Maybe if other religions have similar consequences, we should equitably split children among those religions, to maximize the number of "saved children" who will not go to hell assuming one is correct!)
Of course, nobody would take this seriously, because the "possibility" Christianity is true is importantly different from the "possibility" that, say, some people might be in the house scheduled for demolition. The latter is an epistemic possibility and the former a metaphysical possibility. That seems to matter here.
(Also, sorry, I think the factory farming thing is a bit of a dodge - would you be in favor of banning killing animals for meat full stop? Like many other people, I also oppose factory farming, but I don't do so on the basis of moral risk. I think there's a good positive argument laid out for doing so. If my only argument were that it's *possible* factor farming is wrong, I wouldn't put stock in that either)
The reason why the religion case is unique is that you have multiple options with the SAME expected utility (i.e. infinite). Some forms of Christianity offer infinite hell to unbelievers, but so does Islam, for example. Since the promised rewards are equal, there's only one remaining factor, namely your credence in the various religions (again, see the literature on modern versions of Pascal's wager, particularly the so-called "many gods" problem).
This is quite different from the abortion argument: in this case, you have multiple options (i.e. the various theories of personhood), each of which give DIFFERENT expected utilities (e.g. some say that abortion is murder, others that it is unobjectionable, others something in the middle). So here we can employ fairly standard decision theoretic tools when doing our calculation. This is why, in ordinary circumstances, small risks of terrible consequences can render an action impermissible (think of the demolition case).
The distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility is irrelevant here. Nobody in contemporary philosophy thinks that you can't employ probability theory to choose between different metaphysical views, even though true metaphysical views are probably necessarily true. For instance, it's plausible that whichever theory of personhood is true is necessarily true, i.e. the others are not metaphysically possible. But they're all still epistemic possibilities, since we don't know for sure which one is correct. The same goes for religions, incidentally, which is why it's still possible to argue about which (if any) religion is correct, in spite of the fact that the conclusion would be metaphysically necessary.
I don't oppose killing animals for meat full-stop, but that's because non-human animals definitely aren't persons (i.e. there's literally no theory of personhood on which they are). So I think killing an animal in a humane way is probably permissible, but even if I'm wrong about that, the stakes are vastly lower than they are in the abortion case.
Really, the only way to avoid the argument I gave above is to argue that moral risk just doesn't matter at all (so e.g. it would be permissible to demolish the building in the example I gave), OR that the risk in the thought experiment isn't sufficiently large (i.e. it would be permissible to push the button), OR that there are relevant disanalogies between the thought experiment and abortion (despite the fact that I addressed all of the obvious points in the post itself). The only other option is to accept the conclusion that abortion is impermissible.
>> The reason why the religion case is unique is that you have multiple options with the SAME expected utility (i.e. infinite).
I addressed this; even if you aren't sure which religion is correct, you should still force people to adhere to (one of) the religions that has the worse consequences for non-believers and simply forbid atheism, which has no bad consequences for non-believers.
>> that's because non-human animals definitely aren't persons (i.e. there's literally no theory of personhood on which they are).
This isn't true (in Peter Singer's view on personhood, cows and pigs are persons, for instance). It's actually pretty common to assert that pigs or dogs are persons in secular spaces.
Again, there are multiple religions which offer INFINITE negative utility to non-believers. So the notion of one religion having the "worst consequences for non-believers" isn't coherent. This is a well-known problem in the literature (i.e. the "many gods" problem for Pascal's wager).
Also, it isn't at all common (among philosophers, at least) to regard pigs and cows as persons. Maybe some people in atheist forum communities think that, but it's quite rare among ethicists. Even Singer doesn't claim this with any confidence; he thinks chimps are persons (which is already a very rare view), and refers to the idea of dogs and pigs being persons as "speculative" (Practical Ethics, 119). It's worth noting that the theory of personhood which he accepts to reach this conclusion also causes him to say that "newborn infants and some intellectually disabled humans" (ibid., 101) are non-persons. But you're right, I shouldn't have said "literally no theory."
Also of interest is the following quote:
>> [If] it is wrong to kill a person when we can avoid doing so, and there is real doubt about whether a being we are thinking of killing is a person, we should give that being the benefit of the doubt. The rule here is the same as that among deer hunters: if you see something moving in the bushes and are not sure if it is a deer or a hunter, don't shoot! (Ibid., 119)
This is exactly the argument I made above: if there is serious doubt about whether a being is a person, then it is plausibly wrong to kill it.
As I said, there are only three options for avoiding the argument I gave:
1. Deny that moral risk is ever relevant.
2. Bite the bullet in the thought experiment (i.e. say that it would be permissible to push the button).
3. Find a relevant disanalogy between the thought experiment and abortion.
It sounds like you're trying to go with (1), but you don't seem to be willing to accept the consequences of that view, namely that you'd have to accept that there is nothing wrong with e.g. the demolition example that I gave.
I’m a big fan of prudence based arguments, it’s currently my main argument for personhood objections, I think .2 needs some more work in the actual post, maybe provide alternative theory’s that imply personhood at conception ie idealism, soul theory, substance dualism, hylomorphism, animalist etc
Thanks. The basic thought (i.e. that even a small chance of fetal personhood renders abortion impermissible) is not original to me (Alex Pruss has a blog post making the point, and Peter Kreeft talks about it lot in his work on the topic) but the particular thought experiment is my own.
This sort of logic could be used to justify forcing people to take lots of ridiculous positions so long as there's "reasonable debate" over the truth of the position and one side claims terrible consequences if they are correct.
If vegans are right, eating meat is deeply immoral. The debate over eating meat is complicated. Therefore, let's ban meat eating to be "safe".
If Christians are right, raising your kid up as a non-Christian is deeply immoral. The possible consequences of raising a child in a secular household (your child dies and goes to hell) are much worse than the consequences of forcing parents to raise a child as a Christian. Therefore, let's force all parents to raise their children as Christians.
Moral risk arguments aren't taken seriously for arguments like these. They shouldn't be taken seriously for abortion, either.
A few things.
The religion case is complicated by the fact that there are many different religions, each of which promises infinite rewards and punishments. So it isn't as simple as "if the Christians are right, it would be bad for you, so you'd better not risk it." Of course, one might argue that it's rationally obligatory to follow the religion that one takes to be the most likely (modern versions of Pascal's wager work this way), and that doesn't strike me as implausible.
The veganism point might actually just be correct; I DO think it's immoral to eat factory farmed animal products, and a large part of this is based on the risk of contributing to enormous suffering. I think banning factory farming would be entirely morally acceptable (though under the circumstances it might not be possible, I'm not sure). It's also worth noting that even hardline vegans don't think that cows and chickens are persons, so the stakes here are much lower than with abortion, where the personhood of the unborn is the core of the debate.
Moral risk arguments in general are not rejected outright. Here's an obvious example: suppose you're about to demolish a building, and you're only about 90% sure that it's been completely evacuated. Is it morally permissible to demolish the building? If you say no (and you obviously should), then you're granting the basic line of reasoning used above.
I don't think the fact other religions exist has much impact on the argument. There are other theories of personhood, and they don't seem to impact your version of the moral risk argument. Rather, your argument assumes that the theory of personhood where abortion has the *most* devastating consequences (the personhood from conception view) should be the one considered when making the moral risk argument against the legality of abortion. The likelihood of this particular view of personhood being correct does not come into play, so long as you assert a non-zero likelihood of the extreme position being correct.
Likewise, by your reasoning, we should consider only the religious positions where not converting has the worst consequences. Christianity has some of the worst consequences for not converting (Hell for eternity, under some forms) and so, by your reasoning, Christianity should be the "default" for all parents. (Maybe if other religions have similar consequences, we should equitably split children among those religions, to maximize the number of "saved children" who will not go to hell assuming one is correct!)
Of course, nobody would take this seriously, because the "possibility" Christianity is true is importantly different from the "possibility" that, say, some people might be in the house scheduled for demolition. The latter is an epistemic possibility and the former a metaphysical possibility. That seems to matter here.
(Also, sorry, I think the factory farming thing is a bit of a dodge - would you be in favor of banning killing animals for meat full stop? Like many other people, I also oppose factory farming, but I don't do so on the basis of moral risk. I think there's a good positive argument laid out for doing so. If my only argument were that it's *possible* factor farming is wrong, I wouldn't put stock in that either)
The reason why the religion case is unique is that you have multiple options with the SAME expected utility (i.e. infinite). Some forms of Christianity offer infinite hell to unbelievers, but so does Islam, for example. Since the promised rewards are equal, there's only one remaining factor, namely your credence in the various religions (again, see the literature on modern versions of Pascal's wager, particularly the so-called "many gods" problem).
This is quite different from the abortion argument: in this case, you have multiple options (i.e. the various theories of personhood), each of which give DIFFERENT expected utilities (e.g. some say that abortion is murder, others that it is unobjectionable, others something in the middle). So here we can employ fairly standard decision theoretic tools when doing our calculation. This is why, in ordinary circumstances, small risks of terrible consequences can render an action impermissible (think of the demolition case).
The distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility is irrelevant here. Nobody in contemporary philosophy thinks that you can't employ probability theory to choose between different metaphysical views, even though true metaphysical views are probably necessarily true. For instance, it's plausible that whichever theory of personhood is true is necessarily true, i.e. the others are not metaphysically possible. But they're all still epistemic possibilities, since we don't know for sure which one is correct. The same goes for religions, incidentally, which is why it's still possible to argue about which (if any) religion is correct, in spite of the fact that the conclusion would be metaphysically necessary.
I don't oppose killing animals for meat full-stop, but that's because non-human animals definitely aren't persons (i.e. there's literally no theory of personhood on which they are). So I think killing an animal in a humane way is probably permissible, but even if I'm wrong about that, the stakes are vastly lower than they are in the abortion case.
Really, the only way to avoid the argument I gave above is to argue that moral risk just doesn't matter at all (so e.g. it would be permissible to demolish the building in the example I gave), OR that the risk in the thought experiment isn't sufficiently large (i.e. it would be permissible to push the button), OR that there are relevant disanalogies between the thought experiment and abortion (despite the fact that I addressed all of the obvious points in the post itself). The only other option is to accept the conclusion that abortion is impermissible.
>> The reason why the religion case is unique is that you have multiple options with the SAME expected utility (i.e. infinite).
I addressed this; even if you aren't sure which religion is correct, you should still force people to adhere to (one of) the religions that has the worse consequences for non-believers and simply forbid atheism, which has no bad consequences for non-believers.
>> that's because non-human animals definitely aren't persons (i.e. there's literally no theory of personhood on which they are).
This isn't true (in Peter Singer's view on personhood, cows and pigs are persons, for instance). It's actually pretty common to assert that pigs or dogs are persons in secular spaces.
Again, there are multiple religions which offer INFINITE negative utility to non-believers. So the notion of one religion having the "worst consequences for non-believers" isn't coherent. This is a well-known problem in the literature (i.e. the "many gods" problem for Pascal's wager).
Also, it isn't at all common (among philosophers, at least) to regard pigs and cows as persons. Maybe some people in atheist forum communities think that, but it's quite rare among ethicists. Even Singer doesn't claim this with any confidence; he thinks chimps are persons (which is already a very rare view), and refers to the idea of dogs and pigs being persons as "speculative" (Practical Ethics, 119). It's worth noting that the theory of personhood which he accepts to reach this conclusion also causes him to say that "newborn infants and some intellectually disabled humans" (ibid., 101) are non-persons. But you're right, I shouldn't have said "literally no theory."
Also of interest is the following quote:
>> [If] it is wrong to kill a person when we can avoid doing so, and there is real doubt about whether a being we are thinking of killing is a person, we should give that being the benefit of the doubt. The rule here is the same as that among deer hunters: if you see something moving in the bushes and are not sure if it is a deer or a hunter, don't shoot! (Ibid., 119)
This is exactly the argument I made above: if there is serious doubt about whether a being is a person, then it is plausibly wrong to kill it.
As I said, there are only three options for avoiding the argument I gave:
1. Deny that moral risk is ever relevant.
2. Bite the bullet in the thought experiment (i.e. say that it would be permissible to push the button).
3. Find a relevant disanalogy between the thought experiment and abortion.
It sounds like you're trying to go with (1), but you don't seem to be willing to accept the consequences of that view, namely that you'd have to accept that there is nothing wrong with e.g. the demolition example that I gave.
I’m a big fan of prudence based arguments, it’s currently my main argument for personhood objections, I think .2 needs some more work in the actual post, maybe provide alternative theory’s that imply personhood at conception ie idealism, soul theory, substance dualism, hylomorphism, animalist etc
This is quite clever.
Thanks. The basic thought (i.e. that even a small chance of fetal personhood renders abortion impermissible) is not original to me (Alex Pruss has a blog post making the point, and Peter Kreeft talks about it lot in his work on the topic) but the particular thought experiment is my own.